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Abstract 
  Cultural traits shape both the scope and the consequences of government 
intervention. Failing to account for cultural differences may therefore bias the estimated 
effects of regulation. This paper investigates the direction and the magnitude of this bias, 
from both a theoretical and an empirical point of view. It presents a simple model in which 
agents differ in terms of trust and trustworthiness, and average trust predicts average 
trustworthiness across countries. Entrepreneurial activity by the untrustworthy imposes 
negative externalities on the whole economy and burdensome entry regulations may lower 
these externalities at the cost of limiting economic activity by all agents. The model delivers 
two main predictions: within each country, preferences for regulations depend negatively on 
individual trust; across countries, lower trustworthiness drives higher levels of unofficial 
activity, negative externalities and government regulation, thus inducing a positive spurious 
correlation between all these variables. Evidence from individual level and cross-country 
data is consistent with these implications of the model. In particular, it suggests that a large 
part of the previously estimated negative effects of regulation can be attributed to omitted 
variation in cultural traits. 
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* Bank of Italy, Economics, Research and International Relations.    1 Introduction
Government intervention is often blamed for entailing large economic ineciencies. In
particular, burdensome regulation of economic activity may distort the ecient allocation
of resources by driving individuals and rms out of the ocial markets and into the
informal sector (Johnson et al., 1998; Friedman et al., 2000; Schneider and Enste, 2000;
Djankov et al., 2002). Most importantly, regulation also seems ineective in preventing or
correcting market failures. Available empirical evidence suggests that, on average, greater
regulation is not associated with lower negative externalities across countries (Djankov
et al., 2002).
These ndings are consistent with public choice theories which consider regulation a
purely rent-seeking device beneting a restricted group of insiders (bureaucrats, politicians
and industry incumbents) at the expense of the other agents in the economy (Tullock,
1967; Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1976). On the other hand, while in every country the
insiders represent only a small fraction of the population, a much larger share would
support greater government intervention. Recent survey evidence shows that, in a large
sample of countries, about half of the people believe that the government should actually
increase control over rms; see Figure 1. Most importantly, this fraction is much lower
among bureaucrats and politicians, which is strongly at odds with rent-seeking models of
regulation.1
This paper oers an alternative explanation that can reconcile the existence of positive
excess demand for government intervention by individuals at large within each country
with the empirical relationship between regulations and market failures that is observed
across countries. This explanation hinges crucially on within- and between-country vari-
ation in two cultural traits, namely trust and trustworthiness. In particular, the rst
contribution of this paper is to show that, within each economy, the individual demand
for regulation depends negatively on trust towards others. This relationship has far-
reaching implications for the empirical pattern of regulation and market failures across
countries characterized by a dierent degree of (average) trustworthiness. In particular,
if average trustworthiness is negatively related to the incidence of market failures and if
average trust predicts average trustworthiness across countries, then omitted variation in
trustworthiness will bias the estimated eect of regulation on market failures upwards.
The second contribution of this paper is thus to address the importance of this bias by
explicitly incorporating heterogeneity in trust and trustworthiness into the analysis.
Preliminary evidence presented in the next section suggests that the bias induced
 Contacts: Bank of Italy, Structural Economic Analysis Department, Via Nazionale 91, 00184 Rome.
Email: paolo.pinotti@bancaditalia.it. I wish to thank Milo Bianchi, Antonio Ciccone, Federico Cingano,
Luigi Guiso, Enrico Sette, Luigi Zingales and seminar participants at the Bank of Italy and EIEF for
useful comments. This is a heavily revised version of a previous paper that circulated with the title Trust,
Honesty and Regulations. The opinions expressed herein are my own and do not necessarily reect those
of the Bank of Italy.
1These results refer to a sample of 37,222 individuals from 32 countries interviewed during the period
1999-2002. The questionnaire and the data are described in greater detail in the next sections.
5by omitted variation in culture is signicant. After controlling for dierences in trust,
regulation is not related any more to the size of the unocial sector and it is negatively and
signicantly related to the level of negative externalities (as proxied by water pollution).
These ndings are not in contrast with public choice theories of government intervention,
in that the supply of regulation could well respond to the predatory motives emphasized
by previous literature. On the demand side, however, they suggest that pressures for
regulation are driven (among other things) by market failures occurring in the rst place.
This view is in line with the public interest theory of regulation initiated by Pigou (1938),
according to which government intervention provides a (second best) solution to market
ineciencies (see also Banerjee, 1997; Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000). As a matter of fact,
all countries impose pervasive regulations in those sectors characterized to a greater extent
by negative externalities, natural monopolies, incomplete information and moral hazard
(e.g. public utilities, professional services and the healthcare sector).
Culture enters this framework by inuencing both the risk of market failures and the
individual beliefs about such risks. With respect to the rst issue, some cultural traits
may prevent individuals from taking advantage of market imperfections at the expense
of other agents, even when it would be optimal to do so from an economic point of
view. While this is a departure from the standard homo economicus assumption, it is
a widely accepted one. In particular, both experimental and non-experimental evidence
show that elements of the cultural sphere such as moral values, religious beliefs and social
norms may induce individuals to privilege social outcomes over their own private economic
interests. Cultural tendencies towards cooperation have been alternatively referred to in
the literature as civicness, generalized (as opposed to limited) morality, social capital or,
especially in experimental economics, trustworthiness (for a recent survey, see Tabellini,
2008).
It is even more uncontroversial in the literature that individual trust reects, to some
extent, expectations about others' trustworthiness. In particular, several papers character-
ize trust as a mixture of rational beliefs about trustworthiness and behavioral components
such as risk preferences and betrayal aversion (Barr, 2003; Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004;
Bohnet et al., 2008; Fehr, 2008).2 Therefore, individuals with lower trust would predict on
average a higher propensity by the other individuals in the economy to take advantage of
market failures; if the demand for government regulation is motivated (at least in part) by
concerns for market failures, these same individuals should then prefer more government
intervention.
Section 3 frames this idea into a simple model with heterogeneity in individual val-
ues and beliefs. In particular, some agents are trustworthy and never take advantage of
market imperfections, while the others do so whenever it is in their economic interest.
In particular, untrustworthy entrepreneurs exert negative externalities on the rest of the
economy by adopting cheaper (but polluting) technologies. Trust is simply the subjective
2For a dierent view see Glaeser et al. (2000), according to whom individual trust reects one's own
(rather than others') trustworthiness.
6belief about the fraction of trustworthy agents in the population.
Entry regulations impose an upfront (wasteful) cost on all entrants in the market. This
cost depends on entrepreneurial ability. Since less ecient producers also have the greatest
incentives (whenever they are untrustworthy) to adopt cheaper technologies, regulation
acts as a screening device in a way analogous to Banerjee (1997). Indeed, regulation
eectively screens entrants in the market, but it does so ineciently for two main reasons.
First, the untrustworthy producers averted from the ocial market may still operate
unocially; if they choose to do so, however, they must limit their size, which in turn
also reduces the equilibrium level of negative externalities. Second, regulation imposes a
burden on all producers, including the trustworthy ones.
The expected costs and benets of regulations dier across agents according to their
beliefs about the incidence of untrustworthy producers. In particular, trustful agents
predict fewer market failures in the case of no regulation so that, other things equal,
they demand less of it. In Section 4 I test this empirical implication of the model on
individual data from the World Values Survey. Individual-level estimates allow to control
for country-specic factors simply by including country xed eects, which considerably
reduces the scope for omitted variable and endogeneity bias. Also, dierence-in-dierence
estimates across countries relate the trust-driven component of the individual demand for
regulation to economic and institutional characteristics at the country level. Overall, I nd
that trust has a robust, negative eect on individual preferences for regulation, this eect
being greater in countries where market failures are more widespread and the bureaucracy
is less corrupt and more ecient.
Finally, in Section 5 I examine the implications of these ndings for the cross-country
pattern of regulations and market failures. The main model implication in this respect is
that a lower incidence of trustworthiness drives higher levels of unocial activity, negative
externalities and government regulations (through trust), thus inducing a positive (spuri-
ous) correlation between all these variables. To take this into account, I explicitly control
for average trust (as a predictor of average trustworthiness) when estimating the eect of
regulations on unocial activity and negative externalities. Indeed, the empirical evidence
conrms that keeping constant (across countries) the level of average trust considerably
weakens the negative eects of regulations relative to previous estimates.
This paper contributes to a large body of research, initiated by Putnam (1993) and
Fukuyama (1995), investigating the eect of trust on economic activity.3 In particular,
Aghion et al. (2008) and Algan and Cahuc (2009) emphasize the interplay between culture
and formal institutions, focusing in particular on labor market regulations. I contribute
to this strand of literature by investigating the relationship between trust and entry reg-
ulations, both at the micro and macro level. The paper that comes closest to mine is
Aghion et al. (2009), who also estimate a negative relationship between trust and entry
3An important antecedent to this literature is Arrow (1972), who remarked that \much of the economic
backwardness in the world can be explained by the lack of mutual condence". For a recent review see
Tabellini (2008)
7regulations. However, they do not examine the implications of this nding for the empir-
ical evidence on the eects of regulation. My contribution in this respect is to show that
omitted variation in cultural traits may bias previous estimates of such eects because of
the correlation existing between trust and other economic outcomes aected by regulation,
like unocial activity.4
2 Data and preliminary evidence
This section introduces some of the measures of regulation and culture that will be used
throughout the paper and reviews some previous ndings about the relationship between
regulations and market failures.
2.1 Regulation and market failures
Unbundling and measuring institutions is never an easy task. This is especially true for
regulations, due to the extreme variability of formal and informal regulatory practices
around the world. In an extremely inuential paper, Djankov et al. (2002) proposed to
measure entry regulations by the number of procedures required to start a new business.
Such procedures include \obtaining all necessary licenses and permits and completing any
required notications, verications or inscriptions with relevant authorities"; they range
from opening a bank account to scheduling sanitary inspections to the production plants.
Since its introduction, this indicator has been updated yearly on behalf of the World
Bank's Doing Business project.5
While any measure of regulations has its own shortcomings, the Doing Business indica-
tor has the advantage of being available and roughly comparable for almost all countries in
the world. Since its introduction, it has been extensively used to empirically evaluate the
eects of regulations. In the same paper, in fact, Djankov et al. (2002) examine the corre-
lation between regulations and some measures of market failure. Two such measures are
the (estimated) size of the informal sector and the level of water pollution, as measured by
the emissions of kilograms of organic pollutant per day per worker. The results are shown
in the top graphs of Figure 2. Heavier regulations seem associated with worse outcomes
in both respects, the relationship being particularly strong and statistically signicant in
the case of unocial activity. Djankov et al. (2002) interpret these ndings as evidence in
favor of public choice theories of regulation.
2.2 Trust towards others
Cultural traits such as moral values, beliefs and social norms vary widely both within and
across countries. The World Values Survey (WVS hereafter) represents a formidable at-
4La Porta et al. (1997), Slemrod (2002) and Lassen (2007) also nd that the size of the informal sector
depends, negatively, on trust.
5Arrunada (2007) presents a critique of the Doing Business indicators, while Woodru (2006) provides
a more general discussion of the issues involved in the measurement of institutions.
8tempt to provide an adequate account of such heterogeneity by the means of international
questionnaires collecting detailed individual data along several dimensions (economic, so-
cial, cultural, etc.) for more than 200,000 people in 83 countries.6 The results of this
survey deliver, among other things, a measure of individual trust towards others. Ques-
tion A165 of the survey asks: \Generally speaking, would you say that most people can
be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?". I dene a binary
variable trust equal to 1 if the answer was \Most people can be trusted" and 0 otherwise.
This is by far the most widely adopted measure of trust existing in the literature; examples
include Knack and Keefer (1997), Guiso et al. (2006), Tabellini (2005) and Aghion et al.
(2009). Since all other variables refer to the 1990s, I combined data from the second and
third wave of the WVS (which span the periods 1990-1993 and 1994-1999, respectively)
to obtain a cross-country measure of average trust.
It turns out that trust is negatively associated with entry regulations across countries;
see Figure 3. If trust also reects, negatively, the average propensity of (other) individ-
uals in the economy to take advantage of market imperfections, then omitted variation
in trust and trustworthiness could drive part of the (positive) correlation between regula-
tions and market failures. Unfortunately, reliable measures of trustworthiness, allowing to
verify its relationship with average trust, are not easily comparable across countries. For
instance, data about blood donations and voting turnout, which capture the propensity
of individuals to privilege social over private interests, could depend on the development
of the non-prot sector and on the electoral system, respectively, both of which may be
also correlated with regulations. Still, these same measures are more easily comparable
across regions within the same country. In particular, Guiso et al. (2004) have used blood
donations and voting turnout at referenda to measure dierences in social capital across
Italian regions. Both measures are indeed positively and signicantly correlated with
average trust across regions (the correlation coecient is 0.38 for blood donations and
0.48 for voting turnout) as well as strongly correlated with each other (correlation equal
to 0.63). While it is not possible to conclude that such correlations are actually due to
the fact that trust predicts trustworthiness, this evidence suggests nevertheless that trust
may be a proxy for (unobserved) average trustworthiness. Therefore, partialing out the
eect of trust on both regulations and market failures should control, at least in part,
for dierences in trustworthiness across countries. After doing this, heavier regulations
are no longer associated anymore with worse outcomes; see the bottom graphs in Figure
2. My interpretation of this nding is that culture is both an important determinant of
regulations and a confounding factor in previous estimates of their eects.
6Throughout this paper I will refer to version v.20060423 of the database (FOUR-WAVE INTE-
GRATED DATA FILE, 1981-2004), which is available at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/. See the
documentation available therein for an exhaustive description of the survey.
93 The model
Consider an economy populated by a continuum of (innitesimal) agents with total mass
1. All agents can work as employees, in which case they earn a wage standardized to
0, or they can set up a rm and become entrepreneurs. Production costs depend on
both the technology adopted and entrepreneurial ability. Technologies dier in terms of
emissions of negative externalities (think of pollution). Dirty technologies do not require
any investment by the entrepreneur but emit a high level of externalities, equal to 1. Clean
technologies, instead, prevent externalities but impose an upfront cost equal to ! on the
entrepreneur. This cost varies across agents, reecting (negatively) exogenous dierences
in entrepreneurial ability. Assume for simplicity that ! is uniformly distributed between
0 and 1 over the population of agents.
Entrepreneurs must choose whether they want to operate in the ocial or unocial
sector. In the former case, they enjoy greater (gross) prots, equal to  < 1, but must
comply with entry regulations. The cost of complying with entry regulations also depends,
negatively, on entrepreneurial ability. Specically, such cost equals !R, where R is the
amount of red tape required to set up a rm. Therefore, both the cost of preventing ex-
ternalities and the cost imposed by the red tape are proportional to !; the main dierence
between the two is that the former remains unobserved, while compliance with red tape
is veriable.
Alternatively, entrepreneurs may escape entry regulations by hiding in the shadow
economy. If they do, however, they must restrict rm size in order not to attract the
attention of regulators; in particular, operating prots and negative externalities generated
by each unocial rm are, respectively,  and , with  < 1. Its inverse  1 may be
interpreted as a measure of enforcement; the higher it is, in fact, the smaller must be a
rm in order not to be detected.7
The private utility of each agent is equal to
U = y   X; (1)
where y is income and X is the total level of negative externalities present in the economy.
Later on I will slightly modify the utility function in (1) to introduce the key ingredient of
the model, namely heterogeneity in values and beliefs. Before doing that, let me clarify the
role of entry regulations in the simple economy described so far, rst under a benevolent
social planner and then in the decentralized equilibrium.
3.1 First and second best optimal regulatory policy
The inequalities  < 1,  < 1 and ! < 1 imply that the social optimum W is attained
when (i) all entrepreneurs prevent externalities, (ii) all rms operate in the ocial economy,
7The size dualism is a well-established theoretical and empirical result in the literature on unocial
activity (see, for instance, Rauch, 1991; Fortin et al., 1997; Amaral and Quintin, 2006; Antunes and
Cavalcanti, 2007).
10and (iii) all and only the agents for which ! <  ! = =(1 + R) < 1 set up a rm (notice
that  ! also equals the measure of entrepreneurs active in the market). The resulting
social welfare function,







is monotonically decreasing in R, which implies that the rst best regulatory policy is
R = 0.
With no benevolent social planner, agents do not internalize negative externalities,
because they take aggregate output and total externalities as given. Therefore, en-
trepreneurial activity always entails (net) social costs in the decentralized economy. Such
costs are greater when rms operate in the ocial sector because their size is bigger, i.e.
   1 < (   1) < 0. Therefore, the optimal policy is to set regulatory barriers so high
as to drive all entrepreneurs into the unocial sector.
Formally, agents enter the ocial sector if and only if    !R > , or ! <  ! =
(1   )=R, otherwise they hide in the shadow economy. Aggregate welfare equals




which is an increasing function of R; therefore, the second-best regulatory policy is ~ R !
+1 (i.e limR!+1 f W = 0).
Thus, the optimal regulatory policy changes dramatically when moving from the social
planner solution to the decentralized economy equilibrium. In the former, entry regulations
represent simply a deadweight cost; in the latter, they provide a second best solution to
market failures. Notice that this policy would also be the one preferred by all agents under
the veil of ignorance, i.e. it would be the majority voting equilibrium as far as agents vote
before learning their ability.
In the remainder of this section I allow for a richer characterization of individual values,
assuming that some agents voluntarily abstain from exerting negative externalities on the
rest of the economy. Under this new assumption, the second best regulatory policy will be
an interior of the set of feasible policies and will depend (negatively) on the incidence of the
new type of agents. I will also investigate the interplay between values, trust, regulatory
policies and the equilibrium level of externalities and unocial activity, both within and
across dierent economies.
3.2 Trust, trustworthiness and regulations
In this section I introduce agent heterogeneity in individual values and beliefs. Starting
with the former, a fraction  of agents are trustworthy, while the remaining part are not.
The utility of the latter is the same as in (1), while that of trustworthy agents suers psy-
11chological penalties for emitting negative externalities or hiding in the shadow economy.8
In particular, assume that these penalties are so high that trustworthy entrepreneurs al-
ways operate in the ocial sector and invest to prevent externalities.
Turning to beliefs, agents do not know the exact proportion of trustworthy individuals
in the economy, but hold expectations about this proportion, denoted by ^ . Such expec-
tations reect both the true (unobserved)  and idiosyncratic prediction errors, so that
^  is independently distributed across agents according to the cumulative density function
(^ ;). In particular, it seems natural to assume (and even impose) that
0 >  ) (^ ;0) < (^ ;); 8^ : (2)
Equation (2) simply states that idiosyncratic errors are not systematically biased, in that
a higher fraction  of trustworthy individuals raises on average expectations ^ . By the
law of large numbers, the expected fraction of trustworthy agents in the economy is also
the subjective probability that each other individual is trustworthy, so that ^  may be also
interpreted as trust towards others.
3.2.1 Individual preferences for regulation
According to the assumptions above, trustworthy agents only enter the ocial sector
and, whenever they do, they invest to prevent negative externalities. Therefore, the only
choice they face is whether to become entrepreneurs or not, which they do if and only if
!   !t = =(1 + R).
Untrustworthy agents, instead, never invest in clean technology and must decide
whether to enter the ocial sector or hide in the shadow economy; they will choose the
former if and only if !   !u = (1   )=R.9
Since trustworthy agents behave in line with social welfare maximization (the social
planner case), while the untrustworthy act non-cooperatively, the social welfare function
is now a weighted average of W and f W, with weights equal to the relative size of the
two groups in the population ( and 1   , respectively). Not surprisingly, the optimal
















(1 )2. Notice that R is an interior solution between
R and ~ R, and it approaches one extreme or the other depending on : the higher the
fraction of trustworthy agents, the closer the market equilibrium is to the rst best outcome
and the lower the need for public intervention, i.e. R approaches R = 0; at the opposite
8This way of modeling trustworthiness is adopted, for instance, by Frank (1987) and Kandel and Lazear
(1992).
9In principle, the untrustworthy could also decide not to enter at all, but this choice is always dominated
by that of hiding in the shadow economy as  > 0
12end, the lower the fraction of trustworthy agents, the farther away the market equilibrium
is from the rst best outcome and the greater the need for public intervention, i.e. R
approaches ~ R ! +1. Therefore, the higher the extent of market failures in the rst
place, the higher the optimal level of entry regulations. Individual demand for regulation
depends in a similar way on expected trustworthiness. Therefore, it diers from R (and
from one agent to another) because of heterogeneity in ^ .10
The expected utility of trustworthy agents, conditional on trust, is thus
Ut(^ ) =  !t   (1 + R)
Z  !t
0
!d!   (1   ^ )[ !u + (1    !u)];
which is maximized for
rt(^ ) = 2(1   )2=(1   ^ ): (3)
According to this condition, the preferred level of entry barriers depends, negatively, on
trust towards others. Moreover, the eect of trust is stronger the greater is the cost of
negative externalities relative to the benets of economic activity, 1=, and the better is
the quality of institutions, i.e. the lower is .
Turning to the untrustworthy agents, their expected utility is




which is increasing (decreasing) in R if and only if ^  < 1 =2 (^  > 1 =2), so that the
preferred level of regulations is one of the two corners of the set of feasible policies:
ru =
(
0 , ^  > 1   =2
1 , ^  < 1   =2
(4)
Therefore, the level of red tape preferred by each untrustworthy agent is also inversely
related to individual trust.
The rst implication of the model is therefore that, at the individual level, preferences
for regulation depend negatively on trust towards others. Next, I turn to examine the
implications of this result for the cross country-pattern of trust, regulations and market
failures.
3.2.2 Trust, regulations and market failures across countries
There are several economies, j = 1;2;:::;J, like the one just described. Within each
economy, regulatory policy is chosen by majority voting. Individuals vote behind the veil
of ignorance about their own ability, even though they know the distribution of ! over the
10It would also dier because of heterogeneity in entrepreneurial ability. However, in order to focus on
the role of cultural traits, let me introduce a veil of ignorance about !, so that each agent knows only its
distribution over the population (but not his/her own ability).
13whole population.11 Voting entails some eort so that only trustworthy individuals vote;
by contrast, the untrustworthy take electoral results as given. While somewhat ad hoc,
this assumption is consistent with other work relating electoral participation to civicness
(see, for instance, Guiso et al., 2004). Under this last set of assumptions, the regulatory
policy voted in country j is




m denotes the median level of trust.
Equations (2) and (5) taken together deliver two additional implications of the model.
First, the negative relationship between regulations and trust carries over across countries.
Second, regulatory policy ultimately depends, negatively, on trustworthiness. By the
implicit function theorem, in fact, the stochastic dominance assumption in (2) denes ^ m
as a positive function of ,
(^ m;) = 1=2 ) d^ m= > 0: (6)
Finally, the equilibrium level of unocial activity (as measured by total prots of rms
operating in the informal sector) and externalities in each country depends on regulations
and also, negatively, on trustworthiness
Sj = (1   j)(1    !j
u)jj = (1   j)[1   j(1   j)=Rj]jj; (7)
Xj = (1   j)[ !j
u + (1    !j
u)j] = (1   j)[j + j(1   j)2=Rj]: (8)
Therefore, the common dependence on trustworthiness aects the observed relationship
with regulation. For the case of unocial activity, it steepens the positive univariate
regression line; for the case of externalities, it attens the negative relationship and it
may also turn it into a positive one. Section 5 will provide some evidence to quantify
this bias; before doing that, I empirically examine the predictions of the model for the
individual-level demand for regulation.
4 Individual-level evidence
The simple model in the previous section implies that, at the individual level, preferences
for regulation depend negatively on trust.
4.1 Estimating equation
The WVS provides a measure of preferences for regulation. Question E042 in section
Politics and Society of WVS asks each individual whether \The state should give more
freedom to rms" or rather \The state should control rms more eectively". It thus
11You can think of this as a two-period economy: in the rst period individuals vote over regulatory
policies; in the second period they learn their ability and decide whether they want to set up a rm or not.
14measures the individual excess demand for regulations (relative to the level that is actually
observed in the country). The answer to this question takes on discrete values between 1
and 10, with higher values corresponding to higher demand for government intervention,
and it was included in the survey sent to 32 European countries participating in the fourth
wave of the survey (1999-2004), listed in Table 1. This measure will serve as the dependent
variable of the estimating equation; let it be denoted by y.
In the model above, the individual demand for regulation is always inversely related to
trust; however, the exact form of this relationship depends on the agent's trustworthiness,
according to conditions (3) and (4). For simplicity, my estimating equation will be based on
the sole preferences of the trustworthy, which depend continuously on trust. In particular,













One complication arises from the fact that y is a continuous variable, while its empirical
counterpart y is a discrete index between 1 and 10. Following a standard approach, let
y be the (unobserved) latent preferences driving the choice of each i-th individual among
the k's possible values of y. In particular,
yi = k , k 1  y
i + i  k k = 1;2;:::;10
where  is an error term and the s are unknown thresholds to be estimated. The odds
ratio of individual i preferring a higher level of regulation, i.e. yi > k, is









where  is the c.d.f. of . Assuming that  is logistic and plugging trusti for ^  into
equation (9) delivers
lni(yi > k) =  k + j   jtrusti: (10)
The linear log-odds ratio in (10) characterizes the ordered logit model, which can be
estimated by Maximum Likelihood.
The main advantage of the logit model (relative, for instance, to the ordered probit) is
that it provides an easy interpretation of the coecients. In particular, the exponentiated
coecient equals the ratio of the odds of y > k over the same odds when the explanatory
variable is lower by one unit. This is a particularly useful property given that trust is a
binary variable, so that
e  =
i(yi > kjtrusti = 1)
i(yi > kjtrusti = 0)
i.e. the exponentiated coecient of trust is simply the ratio between the odds of preferring
more regulation of a trustful individual over the same odds of a non-trustful individual.
The term j in (10) will be absorbed by country-specic xed eects, thus reducing the
15scope for omitted variable bias and reverse causality due to dierences in country-specic
factors, such as the severity of market failures and the quality of regulation.12
The right-hand side of equation (10) will also control extensively for individual char-
acteristics such as age, gender, income, education, occupation, etc., which are included in
the WVS data. Table 1 reports the sample size for each country included in the survey,
along with the total population, which makes apparent the unbalanced coverage of WVS
across countries (coverage is relatively lower for larger countries). I thus weighted obser-
vations according to the product of national sampling weights (provided by the WVS)
and country populations. However, all results presented below are unaected when using
unweighted observations.
4.2 Results
Tables 2 to 5 present the results of individual-level estimates. Both the simple and ex-
ponentiated coecients (i.e. the odds ratios) are reported. The rst column in Table 2
presents the results of the univariate regression pooling all individuals. The coecient of
trust is negative and very high in absolute value. Removing cross-country heterogeneity
(column 2) halves the value of the coecient, which however remains strongly statisti-
cally signicant. According to this estimate, the odds of y > k for a trustful individual
are about 15 percent lower than the same odds for a non-trustful individual. Due to the
inclusion of country-specic intercepts, this dierence may be interpreted as the excess
demand for regulations by trustful individuals relative non-trustful ones, keeping constant
the level and quality of actual regulation (as well as any other country-specic factor).
The remaining columns of the table control for some individual characteristics: age,
gender, income and schooling. These variables will be also included in all subsequent
tables. The main result is that those groups that are traditionally disadvantaged in eco-
nomic markets (by gender, income and education) prefer higher levels of regulation. In
one of the next tables I will also allow the slope coecient to dier across these groups.
Before doing that, Table 3 investigates the robustness of the results to an additional
set of control variables that are probably correlated with both trust and preferences for
regulation. Column (1) starts with the labor market condition. It turns out that those
unemployed are on average more in favor of regulation. The next column distinguishes
between (potential) insiders and non-insiders of regulations. In line with the descriptive
evidence in Figure 1, bureaucrats and politicians do not seem to be more attached to reg-
ulations relative to other agents, while entrepreneurs and other self-employed individuals
are bitterly against them. In column (3) I include measures of trust towards those groups
12One complication with this approach is that xed eects are unattractive in non-linear models. The
problem is that the estimator of each of these \incidental" parameters uses only information from the
corresponding group so that, when the size of each group is limited and small, the variance of the estimator
(both of the intercepts and the slope) does not asymptotically converge to 0 (see, for instance, Greene,
2004). This is usually the case for panels of N cross-sectional units observed over T periods. However, in
this case I have thousands of (individual) observations available to estimate each (country) xed eect, so
that the relevant asymptotics allow for consistent estimation.
16in charge of dictating and enforcing regulations, namely politicians and civil servants. I
also include trust towards the judicial system, which may potentially substitute regulation
in addressing some types of market failure (reconducible, for instance, to moral hazard
and asymmetric information). None of these variables, however, subtracts explanatory
power from trust; indeed, they are not even signicant in the regression, suggesting that
the coecient of main interest is not capturing the eect of other cultural traits possi-
bly correlated with trust. This is also true when controlling for political ideology, even
though in this case the coecient of partisan is strongly statistically signicant and it
has the expected sign (individuals leaning toward to right preferring less government in-
tervention). The next column distinguishes individuals according to whether they profess
a hierarchical religion or not. After controlling for individual trust, hierarchical religion
does not seem to aect directly the demand for regulation. In the next section I will rely
on this nding to exploit religion as a source of exogenous variation in individual trust
across countries. Overall, the coecient of trust remains strongly statistically signicant
and extremely stable throughout all columns of Table 3; this conclusion holds true also in
the last column, which includes all control variables in the same specication.
Table 4 shows how the slope (other than the intercept) of the regression changes with
individual and country characteristics. The rst two columns distinguish between non-
insiders and insiders. It turns out that trust aects only the demand for regulation by the
former group. The preferences of the insiders, indeed, could respond more to the private
interests emphasized by the public choice literature. The next two columns distinguish
individuals according to their educational attainment, the demand by less educated in-
dividuals being more responsive to trust. Actually, this segment of the population may
be more vulnerable to some types of market failure (like, for instance, asymmetric infor-
mation), so that the mechanism proposed in this paper may be more relevant for this
category. Finally, the eect of trust does not signicantly dier by individual income, age
and gender.13
The last four columns start distinguishing the eect of trust according to country
(rather than individual) characteristics. Intuitively, the eect of trust should be stronger
in countries in which the costs of market externalities are higher relative to the benets
of economic activity. This is captured in the model by the term  1 in equation (3),
which increases (in absolute value) the slope of trust. Even though an exact empirical
counterpart for this parameter is not easily available, Djankov et al. (2002) suggest that
\Market failures are likely to be both more pervasive and severe in poor countries than in
rich ones". This may be due for instance, to the fact that less developed countries have
backward and more polluting technologies. Therefore, in columns (5) and (6) I compare
the eect of trust separately in Eastern and Western European countries. In line with the
discussion above, the eect is stronger in the former group of countries; in particular, the
ratio between the odds of demanding more regulation for an untrustful individual over
those of a trustful one is twice as much in Eastern as in Western countries.
13These results are not reported but are available upon request
17On the other hand, the quality of government intervention may also be worse in less
developed countries (for instance, because of more widespread corruption), which in turn
would discourage (untrustful) individuals from demanding more regulation. This last eect
is captured in the model by the term  in equation (3), a higher  (indicating a lower quality
of institutions) decreasing the coecient of trust. To disentangle the eect of economic
development from that of institutional quality, the last two columns of the table present
separate regressions for Eastern and Western Germany, respectively. Even a decade after
reunication the two areas had very dierent levels of economic development; on the other
hand, they shared the same formal institutions, which in turn allows to distinguish between
the eect of economic and institutional factors. As expected, keeping institutional quality
constant further increases the dierential eect of trust in less developed regions.
The dierence-in-dierence specication in Table 5 takes a more systematic approach
by interacting individual trust with country characteristics possibly correlated with the
risk and the severity of market failure and with the eectiveness and eciency of regu-
latory responses. The rst of these measures is the (log of) real GDP per capita in year
2000 (at constant 2005 PPP international dollars), which proxies for the level of economic
development. Institutional characteristics are measured by indexes of corruption, regula-
tory quality and government eectiveness provided by the last release of the World Bank
Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al., 2008). All indexes are increasing in institutional
quality and they have been rescaled to have zero mean and standard deviation equal to 1
(the same is true also for the index of economic development), so that the odds ratio of the
interaction term may be read as the ratio between the odds of preferring more regulation
for a trustful individual that lives in a country with a (one standard deviation) higher level
of economic and/or institutional development, and the same odds for a trustful individual
living in the average country.
The interaction of individual trust with economic development (column 1) is only
weakly statistically signicant, and the interactions with each of the institutional variables
are not signicant. This is due to the fact that the three institutional indexes are positively
and strongly correlated with the level of economic development, as shown in Figure 3; at
the same time, economic development and institutional quality aect the slope coecient
of trust in opposite directions.
In fact, interacting both economic and institutional factors with trust in the same
specication raises both the magnitude and the statistical signicance of their eects
(columns 5 to 8). In particular, the eect of trust seems stronger in less developed countries
and in countries with relatively less corrupt public ocials, better regulatory quality and
more ecient governments. Consistently with the previous comparison between Eastern
and Western Europe, the eect of economic development dominates that of institutional
quality, the coecient of the former being twice as much that of the latter. This means
that the greater risk and severity of market failure in less developed countries overcome
the eect of the lower quality of government intervention in driving a higher demand for
regulation by untrustful individuals in such countries.
185 Cross-country evidence
The results presented above suggest that, within each country, trust is a signicant deter-
minant of individual preferences for regulation. In this section I investigate whether this
relationship carries over across countries and its implications for the cross-country pattern
of regulations, externalities and the size of unocial activity.
5.1 Culture and regulation
At the aggregate, cross-country level, the rst prediction of the model is that regulations
depend negatively on (median) trust. The empirical counterpart of condition (5) is
R = a   b^ m + ; (11)
where b is the coecient to be estimated and  is an error term. The cross-country
measures of regulation and trust were already introduced in Section 2; they are the log
number of entry procedures from Djankov et al. (2002) and the average level of trust (as
measured by the WVS). The results of OLS estimates on equation (11) are presented in
Table 7.
The rst column shows the univariate regression of regulation on trust. A one per-
centage point increase in trust is associated on average with a 2 percent reduction in the
number of procedures, this eect being very precisely estimated. Controlling for the level
of economic development, as proxied by the log of GDP per capita in 1999, weakens only
slightly the eect of trust (column 2).14 In column 3 I add the log of total population in
the same year and a dummy variable equal to 1 for countries of British legal origin. The
inclusion of these variables in the specication is motivated by the fact that the creation
of new institutions entails signicant xed costs and is therefore limited by the size of the
market and the level of transaction costs (Demsetz, 1967). Mulligan and Shleifer (2005)
provide evidence consistent with this theory for the specic case of regulatory institutions
using population to measure the size of the market and British legal origin as a proxy for
(higher) transaction costs.15 In my sample too, regulations increase with population and
are less pervasive in countries of British legal origin. Most importantly, both variables
provide sources of exogenous variation in regulation, which will prove extremely useful to
investigate the eects of regulation across countries.16
14The data for all control variables also come from Djankov et al. (2002).
15Their argument is that, historically, the cost of incremental regulations was lower in France than
in England thanks to the pervasive administrative State introduced after the Revolution. As legal and
regulatory frameworks have spread through conquest and colonization, so have the cost structures of
incremental regulations.
16Including on the right-hand side measures of education, democracy and ethno-linguistic fractionaliza-
tion does not signicantly aect the results, in line with the ndings of Aghion et al. (2009).
195.2 Instrumental variable estimates
In principle, one can not rule out reverse causality. For instance, burdensome regulation
could aect average honesty by increasing the incentives for predatory practices and cor-
ruption, which would in turn impact (negatively) on average trust because of equation
(6). Culture could in fact respond endogenously to incentives because of evolutionary
forces (Hirshleifer, 1984; Frank, 1987), rational choice (Benabou and Tirole, 2006) and
intergenerational transmission of moral values (Bisin et al., 2004; Tabellini, 2009). For
this reason, in the last two columns TRUST is instrumented by the share of population
professing either Catholic or Muslim religion, as reported by McCleary and Barro (2006).
Seminal work by Putnam (1993) and La Porta et al. (1997) suggests in fact that hier-
archical religions, namely Catholic and Muslim, are associated with lower trust towards
others compared, for instance, with Protestantism; the individual-level evidence presented
in Guiso et al. (2003) is broadly consistent with this picture. Since (i) country religions are
inherited from the ancient past and (ii) individual level estimates presented in the previous
section exclude that religion aects directly the demand for regulation (after controlling
for trust), I can use religion as a source of exogenous variation in trust, analogously to La
Porta et al. (1997).
The results of rst stage estimates conrm that, in my sample too, a higher fraction
of the population professing a hierarchical religion brings a lower level of trust (column
4). The average eect is identical across dierent hierarchical religions (namely Catholic
and Muslim), so that I group them into a single variable in column (5).
Second stage estimates show that the coecient of trust remains negative and statisti-
cally signicant. Actually, the TSLS coecient is greater in absolute value than the OLS
one, which means that, if anything, the feedback eect from regulation to trust would be
positive. According to these estimates, a standard deviation increase in the percentage
of trustful individuals within the population (equal to 15.3 percent) cuts the red tape by
about 20 percent.
5.3 The eects of regulation
Turning to examine the eects of regulation, the theoretical model predicts that heav-
ier regulation and lower trustworthiness increase the size of the shadow economy across
countries. The empirical counterpart of equation (7) is
S =     + R + ; (12)
where  and  are positive coecients to be estimated and  is an error term independently
distributed from . Excluding  from the specication introduces an (asymptotic) bias
in the OLS estimated coecient ^  equal to plim(^    ) =  Cov(R;)=V ar(R). After
plugging equation (11) for R, the resulting bias is proportional to the covariance between
20average trust and trustworthiness
BIAS =  
b  Cov(^ m;)
V ar(R)
: (13)
Unfortunately, it is not possible to explicitly control for  in equation (13) because,
as discussed in Section 2, reliable measures of trustworthiness are not easily available
across countries. However, notice that the bias is dierent from 0 only insofar as the
covariance between trust and trustworthiness is greater than 0; but whenever the latter is
true, average trust provides a proxy for average trustworthiness. In particular, the greater
this covariance, the greater the bias and the better the extent to which trust approximates
trustworthiness. As discussed before, there are several theoretical arguments and extensive
empirical evidence suggesting that trust and trustworthiness are intimately related.
Table 8 presents the estimates of equation (12). The rst column replicates the re-
gression in Table IV of Djankov et al. (2002). The dependent variable is the size of the
unocial sector (as a percentage of GDP) and the explanatory variable is the measure of
entry regulations. According to this univariate regression, one standard deviation increase
in entry regulations increases the size of the shadow economy by half a standard deviation,
the estimated coecient being very statistically signicant. However, after controlling for
TRUST, the eect of regulations is not signicantly dierent from 0 (column 2). These
estimates suggest that the eect of regulations was capturing omitted variation in cultural
traits, as proxied by average trust. The relative magnitude of the eect of regulation in
column 1 and of trust in column 2 is also identical: one standard deviation increase in the
explanatory variable implies about half a standard deviation decrease in the size of the
shadow economy. One may wonder whether the dierence between the results in column
(1) and (2) lies in the sample, due to the fact that data on trust are missing for almost
one third of the countries. However, this is not the case; re-estimating the univariate
regression in column (1) on the reduced sample available in column (2) leads to a point
estimate of 9.76, statistically signicant at the 99 percent condence level (standard error
1.60).
Djankov et al. (2002) also present one further specication in which they include on the
right-hand side the level of country development, as measured by the log of GDP per capita,
arguing that this variable controls for the risk and severity of market failure. In column (3)
I replicate this specication, thus dropping average trust. Once I do that, the coecient
of regulation is again strongly statistically signicant (even though smaller in magnitude
than the univariate regression in column 1). When I plug back average trust into the
equation (column 4), its coecient is not statistically signicant at the conventional 10
percent condence level. Still, keeping average trust constant across countries is important
for correctly evaluating the eects of regulation; in fact, the coecient of ENTRY drops
from 5.3 to zero when moving from column (3) to column (4).
Finally, in the last two columns of the table I examine the causal impact of both
regulations and culture taking a TSLS approach. In particular, I use population and
21legal origin as instruments for regulation. According to the results in Table 7 and to
those presented in Mulligan and Shleifer (2005), both factors are signicant determinants
of the sphere of government activity. In addition, after controlling for regulation, the
size of the country and the type of legal origin are most likely exogenous (and certainly
predetermined) to the level of informal activities observed in the 1990s. As for trust,
I adopt the same approach as in the previous table, using the cross-country diusion
of hierarchical religions as a source of exogenous variation in average trust. First stage
estimates, reported in the bottom panels of Table 8, conrm that the three instruments
t well the actual variation in both regulation and trust across countries. Moreover, the
Hansen J over-identifying restrictions test can not reject the null hypothesis that they
aect the size of unocial activity only through variation in regulation and average trust.
Turning to second stage estimates, the TSLS coecient of ENTRY is much lower than
the OLS one and it is not statistically signicant, regardless of whether GDP is included or
not in the regression. By contrast, average trust has a negative causal eect on unocial
activity and, even though the two-stage approach makes the estimate somewhat more
noisy, its coecient remains statistically signicant at the conventional condence level.
Table 9 estimates the eect of regulations on another outcome considered by Djankov
et al. (2002), namely the level of water pollution, which is a proxy for the negative ex-
ternalities in the economy. In this case too, Djankov et al. (2002) estimate a positive
coecient on entry regulations, and they interpret this as evidence against public interest
theories of regulation. Once again, however, this result disappears after controlling for
the eect of culture; actually, the coecient becomes negative and strongly statistically
signicant, this result being conrmed also in TSLS regressions.
6 Conclusion
Regulation is often blamed for being both ineective and inecient; however, people seem
reluctant to abandon it. This paper oers a view that may potentially reconcile these
two facts. The main insight is that, far from being exogenously determined, the actual
level of regulation is an equilibrium outcome. In particular, stringent regulations may be
enacted (at least in part) in response to market failure originating in (lack of) attitudes
for cooperation. These attitudes may drive part of the correlation existing between the
level of regulation and several economic outcomes, confounding inference about causality.
I addressed these issues by explicitly controlling for such omitted factors. Actually,
controlling for trust leads to reconsider the eect of regulation on the size of the unocial
economy and the level of negative externalities. Of course, these results do not exclude
the possibility that regulation may be a very inecient solution to market failure. They
suggest, however, that in order to make liberalization and deregulation politically appeal-
ing it might be necessary to foster and improve alternative institutions such as private
litigation and class action.
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25Appendix
Individual-level variables:
Dependent variable: answer to the question \How would you place your views on this
scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement `The state should give more
freedom to rms'; 10 means you agree completely with the statement `The state should
control'; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in be-
tween." Source: WVS, variable E042.
Trust: answer to the question \Generally speaking, would you say that most people can
be trusted?". The variable takes value 1 if the individual answered \Most people can be
trusted", and 0 if the individual answered \Can't be too careful in dealing with people".
Source: WVS, variable A165.
High/low income: binary variables indicating the top and bottom category of a three-value
index recoding household income on a country basis. Source: WVS, variable X047R.
High/low schooling: binary variables indicating the top and bottom category of a three-
value index recoding individual education on a country basis. Source: WVS, variable
X025R.
Unemployment: binary variable indicating whether the individual is unemployed. Source:
WVS, variable X028.
Self employment: binary variable indicating whether the individual is self-employed.
Source: WVS, variable X028.
Manager: binary variable indicating whether the individual is a manager. Source: WVS,
variable X035 (2-digit profession classication).
Burpol: binary variable indicating whether the individual is a politician and/or a high-
ranking public ocial. Source: WVS, variable X035 (2-digit profession classication).
Trust parliament, civil servants, justice: binary variables indicating whether the individ-
ual trusts each institution. Source: WVS, variables E075, E076, E085.
Partisan: 10-category index of individual political ideology, where 1 is extreme left and
10 is extreme right. Source: WVS, variable E033.
Hierarchical: binary variable equal to 1 if the individual belongs to either the Catholic or
Muslim religion. Source WVS, variable F025.
Cross-country variables:
ENTRY: the number of dierent procedures that a start-up has to comply with in order
to obtain legal status. Source: Djankov et al. (2002)
26TRUST: percentage of respondents who answer that \Most people can be trusted" to the
question \Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you
can't be too careful in dealing with people?". Source: WVS (II and III waves), variable
A165.
Unocial activity: size of the informal economy as a percentage of GDP. Source: Djankov
et al. (2002).
Water pollution: emissions of organic water pollutants (kilograms per day per worker) in
1998. Source: Djankov et al. (2002).
lnGDP: log of gross domestic product per capita in current US dollars in 1999. Source:
Djankov et al. (2002)
lnPOP: log of total country population in 1999. Source: Djankov et al. (2002)
UK LEGAL: binary variable indicating British legal origin. Source: Djankov et al. (2002)
HIER: percentage of people in the country professing either the Catholic or Muslim reli-
gion. Source: McCleary and Barro (2006).
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Bureaucrats and Politicians All sample
The histogram shows the distribution of answers to question E042 of the World
Values Survey in 32 countries, distinguishing between two categories of individuals:
bureaucrats and politicians versus other individuals. Answers take on discrete values
between 1 and 10, where 1 means \State should give more freedom to rms" and 10
means \State should control rms more eectively".
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Ln Number of Procedures (residuals)
These graphs show the cross-country correlation between entry regulations and some types of market
failure. The measure of entry regulations is the (log) number of procedures required to open a busi-
ness; Shadow Economy is the (estimated) size of the informal sector; Water Pollution is emissions of
organic water pollutant (kilograms per day per worker). All three measures come from Djankov et al.
(2002). The two graphs on the bottom show the relationship between the residuals of a regression
of each variable on average trust. Average country trust is the fraction of people interviewed by the
World Values Survey in each country that declared that \most people can be trusted".
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trust
This graph shows the cross-country relationship between trust and entry regulation. Average coun-
try trust is the fraction of people interviewed by the World Values Survey in each country that
declared that \Most people can be trusted". The measure of entry regulations is the (log) number
of procedures required to open a business, from Djankov et al. (2002).
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Economic Development
This graph shows the cross country correlation between several measures of institutional
quality. The index of economic development is the standardized logarithm of real GDP per
capita in year 2000 (at constant 2005 PPP International Dollars). The indexes of Control of
Corruption, Regulatory Quality and Government Eciency are from Kaufmann et al. (2008).
29Table 1: Sample
country code sample obs. population
Austria AUT 1523 1366 8,011,560
Belgium BEL 1914 1769 10,252,000
Bulgaria BGR 1002 875 8,060,000
Belarus BLR 1002 832 10,005,000
Czech Republic CZE 1911 1823 10,273,300
Germany DEU 2045 1838 82,210,000
Denmark DNK 1025 905 5,337,344
Spain ESP 2417 1002 40,263,199
Estonia EST 1007 893 1,369,512
Finland FIN 1040 942 5,176,196
France FRA 1617 1519 58,895,516
Great Britain GBR 2005 1717 59,742,980
Greece GRC 1142 948 10,917,500
Croatia HRV 1004 940 4,502,500
Hungary HUN 1003 910 10,210,971
Ireland IRL 1014 923 3,805,399
Iceland ISL 970 900 281,000
Italy ITA 2002 1845 56,948,602
Lithuania LTU 1020 884 3,499,527
Luxemburg LUX 1211 1038 438,000
Latvia LVA 1015 942 2,372,000
Malta MLT 1004 980 390,000
Netherlands NLD 1005 978 15,925,431
Polonia POL 1098 1007 38,453,801
Portugal PRT 1001 883 10,225,803
Romania ROM 1148 1032 22,443,000
Russia RUS 2504 2265 146,303,000
Slovak Republic SVK 1334 1218 5,388,740
Slovenia SVN 1008 926 1,989,000
Sweden SWE 1018 948 8,869,000
Turkey TUR 4609 1107 67,420,000
Ukraine UKR 1196 1067 49,175,848
Total 45814 37222 759,155,750
Notes: This table lists all countries for which individual-level data were avail-
able. For each country, it reports the number of individuals interviewed by the
fourth wave of WVS, the number of non-missing observations (i.e. the num-
ber of individuals that answered both questions about trust and regulation)
and the total population.
30Table 2: Individual-level estimates (baseline)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
pooled country FE demo income school
trust -.349 -.165 -.154 -.157 -.130
[0.705] [0.848] [0.857] [0.855] [0.878]
(.028) (.046) (.046) (.047) (.045)
age=100 .876 1.831 1.911
[2.400] [6.240] [6.759]
(.608) (.811) (.826)
(age=100)2 -.024 -1.141 -1.338
[0.977] [0.319] [0.262]
(.678) (.993) (.982)
female .188 .187 .189
[1.206] [1.205] [1.208]
(.031) (.034) (.035)
high income -.346 -.297
[0.708] [0.743]
(.035) (.034)









obs. 37222 37222 37078 31663 31489
country FE no yes yes yes yes
countries 32 32 32 32
log-L -83648 -82317 -81830 -69661 -69216
log-L0 -83802 -83802 -83487 -71310 -70913
pseudo R2 .002 .018 .02 .023 .024
Notes: This table presents estimates of the eect of trust on preferences for regulation at the indi-
vidual level. The dependent variable is the answer to question E042 in the WVS. It takes on discrete
values from 1 to 10, where 1 means \State should give more freedom to rms" and 10 means \State
should control rms more eectively". The explanatory variable trust is the answer to question A165
in the WVS.: \Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need
to be very careful in dealing with people?". It takes value 1 if the answer was \Most people can be
trusted" and 0 otherwise. All other variables are described in the Appendix. The estimation method
is the Maximum Likelihood ordered logit model. The log-likelihood at the last and rst iteration are
shown at the bottom of each column: the pseudo R2 equals 1 minus the ratio between the two. Odds
ratios are presented in square brackets. Robust standard errors clustered by country are presented
in parenthesis. Observations are weighted by the product of national sampling weights and country
populations. ,  and  denote coecients signicantly dierent from zero at the 90% condence,
95% condence and 99% condence, respectively.
31Table 3: Individual-level estimates (robustness)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
unempl insiders trust partisan religion all
trust -.126 -.141 -.132 -.124 -.130 -.139
[0.882] [0.869] [0.876] [0.883] [0.878] [0.870]













trust parliament -.007 -.074
[0.993] [0.929]
(.057) (.067)
trust civil servants -.002 .057
[0.998] [1.059]
(.033) (.028)









obs. 31357 22875 29107 25862 31489 17748
countries 32 30 32 32 32 30
log-L -68924 -50282 -64057 -56648 -69216 -38811
log-L0 -70616 -51534 -65602 -58409 -70913 -40101
pseudo R2 .024 .024 .024 .03 .024 .032
Notes: This table presents estimates of the eect of trust on preferences for regulation at the indi-
vidual level. The dependent variable is the answer to question E042 in the WVS. It takes on discrete
values from 1 to 10, where 1 means \State should give more freedom to rms" and 10 means \State
should control rms more eectively". The explanatory variable trust is the answer to question A165
in the WVS.: \Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need
to be very careful in dealing with people?". It takes value 1 if the answer was \Most people can be
trusted" and 0 otherwise. All other variables are described in the Appendix. All regressions include
also age, age2, female, high income, low income, high schooling, low schooling and country xed
eects. The estimation method is the Maximum Likelihood ordered logit model. The log-likelihood
at the last and rst iteration are shown at the bottom of each column: the pseudo R2 equals 1
minus the ratio between the two. Odds ratios are presented in square brackets. Robust standard
errors clustered by country are presented in parenthesis. Observations are weighted by the product
of national sampling weights and country populations. ,  and  denote coecients signicantly
dierent from zero at the 90% condence, 95% condence and 99% condence, respectively.
32Table 4: Individual-level estimates (sample splits)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
insiders schooling countries germany
no yes low high Eastern Western Eastern Western
trust -.132 -.063 -.228 .009 -.231 -.085 -.450 -.098
[0.877] [0.939] [0.796] [1.009] [0.794] [0.919] [0.637] [0.907]
(.043) (.100) (.077) (.065) (.112) (.027) (.159) (.145)
obs. 28370 3013 11122 6185 12046 19443 695 715
countries 32 32 32 32 11 21
log-L -62398 -6433 -24189 -13681 -26041 -42801 -1569 -1549
log-L0 -63907 -6658 -24938 -13899 -26578 -43944 -1582 -1561
pseudo R2 .024 .034 .03 .016 .02 .026 .008 .007
Notes: This table presents estimates of the eect of trust on preferences for regulation at the individual level. The
dependent variable is the answer to question E042 in the WVS. It takes on discrete values from 1 to 10, where 1
means \State should give more freedom to rms" and 10 means \State should control rms more eectively". The
explanatory variable trust is the answer to question A165 in the WVS.: \Generally speaking, would you say that
most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?". It takes value 1 if the
answer was \Most people can be trusted" and 0 otherwise. Dierent columns refer to dierent subsamples, indicated
on top of each column. The category insiders includes entrepreneurs, managers, bureaucrats and politicians; the
categories for schooling refer to the binary variable classications. All other variables are described in the Appendix.
All regressions include also age, age2, female, high income, low income, high schooling, low schooling and country
xed eects. The estimation method is the Maximum Likelihood ordered logit model. The log-likelihood at the
last and rst iteration are shown at the bottom of each column: the pseudo R2 equals 1 minus the ratio between
the two. Odds ratios are presented in square brackets. Robust standard errors clustered by country are presented
in parenthesis. Observations are weighted by the product of national sampling weights and country populations.
,  and  denote coecients signicantly dierent from zero at the 90% condence, 95% condence and 99%
condence, respectively.
33Table 5: Individual-country interactions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
trust -.111 -.115 -.114 -.114 -.120 -.135 -.125
[0.895] [0.892] [0.892] [0.892] [0.887] [0.874] [0.883]
(.046) (.044) (.038) (.043) (.030) (.031) (.028)
trust  ECONDEV .115 .290 .284 .322
[1.122] [1.337] [1.329] [1.379]
(.060) (.102) (.094) (.098)
trust  CORRCTR .067 -.170
[1.069] [0.843]
(.059) (.073)
trust  REGQUAL .052 -.173
[1.054] [0.842]
(.054) (.064)
trust  GOV EFF .065 -.203
[1.068] [0.816]
(.058) (.072)
obs. 31489 31489 31489 31489 31489 31489 31489
countries 32 32 32 32 32 32 32
log-L -69201 -69209 -69212 -69210 -69194 -69191 -69192
log-L0 -70913 -70913 -70913 -70913 -70913 -70913 -70913
pseudo R2 .024 .024 .024 .024 .024 .024 .024
Notes: This table presents estimates of the eect of trust on preferences for regulation at the individual level. The
dependent variable is the answer to question E042 in the WVS. It takes on discrete values from 1 to 10, where 1
means \State should give more freedom to rms" and 10 means \State should control rms more eectively". The
explanatory variable trust is the answer to question A165 in the WVS.: \Generally speaking, would you say that
most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?". It takes value 1 if the
answer was \Most people can be trusted" and 0 otherwise. The other variables are interactions of trust with country
characteristics: DEV EL is the level of development, as measured by the (log of) GDP per capita at constant 2005
international dollars; CORRCTR, REGQUAL and GOV EFF are the World Bank Governance Indicators for the
control of corruption, the regulatory quality and the government eectiveness. All country variables are standardized
to have mean 0 and standard deviation equal to 1. All regressions include also age, age2, female, high income,
low income, high schooling, low schooling and country xed eects. The estimation method is the Maximum
Likelihood ordered logit model. The log-likelihood at the last and rst iteration are shown at the bottom of each
column: the pseudo R2 equals 1 minus the ratio between the two. Odds ratios are presented in square brackets.
Robust standard errors clustered by country are presented in parenthesis. Observations are weighted by the product
of national sampling weights and country populations. ,  and  denote coecients signicantly dierent from
zero at the 90% condence, 95% condence and 99% condence, respectively.
34Table 6: Correlation matrix and summary statistics
Correlation matrix
ENTRY TRUST Uno. Act. Water. Poll. lnGDP lnPOP LEGOR UK HIER
TRUST -0.671
Uno. Act. 0.463 -0.648
Water. Poll. -0.097 -0.142 0.343
lnGDP -0.481 0.629 -0.779 -0.273
lnPOP 0.347 -0.233 0.166 -0.130 -0.257
LEGOR UK -0.614 0.250 -0.184 0.069 -0.028 0.234
HIER 0.293 -0.538 0.327 0.084 -0.100 0.001 -0.144
Summary statistics
obs. 86 52 74 77 86 198 86 190
mean 2.229 0.307 28.727 0.183 7.971 15.336 0.291 0.524
std. dev. 0.517 0.153 15.267 0.041 1.641 2.088 0.457 0.342
min. 0.693 0.046 8.600 0.100 5.247 10.652 0 0.002
max. 3.045 0.652 68.800 0.315 10.555 20.949 1 0.993
Notes: This table presents the correlation matrix of variables (top panel) and their summary statistics (bottom
panel) across countries.
35Table 7: Trust and regulation
ols ols ols tsls tsls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TRUST -2.305 -1.896 -1.324 -1.387 -1.382
(.423) (.454) (.309) (.438) (.436)
lnGDP -.087 -.080 -.077 -.077
(.050) (.023) (.030) (.030)
lnPOP .131 .133 .133
(.020) (.019) (.019)
UK LEGAL -.825 -.818 -.818
(.103) (.091) (.091)
obs. 52 52 51 50 50
R2 .4 .433 .816 .815 .815
F 29.715 18.376 36.203 37.016 36.986







F (excl. instr.) 14.14 28.91
J .463
J (p-value) .496
Notes: This table presents OLS and TSLS estimates of the eect of trust on entry regulation
across countries. The top and bottom panel report rst and second stage results, respectively.
The dependent variable is the (log of) number of procedures required to start a new business,
from Djankov et al. (2002). The explanatory variable TRUST is the country average of the
measure of trust in the WVS. lnGDP and lnPOP are the (log of) country GDP per capita
and population in 1999, and UK LEGAL is a dummy equal to one for British legal origin; all
three variables are also from Djankov et al. (2002). The rst stage instruments CATHOL and
MUSLIM equal the fraction of people professing Catholic and Muslim religion, respectively,
in 2000 (McCleary and Barro, 2006); HIER is the sum of the two variables. Robust standard
errors are presented (in parenthesis). The rst stage F statistic for the excluded instruments
and the Hansen J statistic are reported at the bottom of each column. ,  and  denote
coecients signicantly dierent from zero at 90% condence, 95% condence and 99%
condence, respectively.
36Table 8: Regulation and unocial activity
ols ols ols ols tsls tsls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ENTRY 14.522 1.797 5.328 -.114 2.257 1.075
(2.454) (2.591) (2.356) (2.188) (3.836) (2.742)
TRUST -44.208 -17.177 -37.425 -35.321
(12.546) (12.142) (20.357) (16.973)
lnGDP -6.344 -5.859 -4.312
(.999) (1.147) (1.439)
obs. 74 51 74 51 49 49
R2 .254 .385 .563 .663 .409 .633
F 35.02 22.293 45.391 31.59 4.976 28.332
first stage regression for ENTRY
lnPOP .195 .161
(.036) (.028)




F (excl. instr.) 27.64 41.03
first stage regression for TRUST
lnPOP -.027 -.014
(.013) (.009)




F (excl. instr.) 8.76 13.18
J .36 1.553
J (p-value) .85 .213
Notes: This table presents OLS and TSLS estimates of the eect of entry regulations on unocial
activity across countries. The top and bottom panel report rst and second stage results, respectively.
The dependent variable is the size of the shadow economy as a percentage of GDP, from Djankov
et al. (2002). The explanatory variable ENTRY is the (log of) number of procedures required to
start a new business; lnGDP and lnPOP are the (log of) country GDP per capita and population
in 1999; UK LEGAL is a dummy equal to one for British legal origin; all four variables are also
from Djankov et al. (2002). TRUST is the country average of the measure of trust in the WVS.
HIER is the fraction of people professing a hierarchical religion (Catholic and Muslim) in 2000, from
McCleary and Barro (2006). Robust standard errors are presented (in parenthesis). The rst stage
F statistic for the excluded instruments and the Hansen J statistic for the over-identifying conditions
are reported. ,  and  denote coecients signicantly dierent from zero at 90% condence,
95% condence and 99% condence, respectively.
37Table 9: Regulation and negative externalities
ols ols ols ols tsls tsls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ENTRY .013 -.018 -.004 -.021 -.019 -.022
(.008) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.009) (.009)
TRUST -.066 -.047 -.070 -.083
(.026) (.031) (.049) (.047)
lnGDP -.013 -.006 -.004
(.003) (.003) (.004)
obs. 77 50 77 50 49 49
R2 .028 .095 .234 .156 .115 .151
F 2.667 4.408 12.409 4.588 1.987 2.705
first stage regression for ENTRY
lnPOP .183 .139
(.033) (.029)




F (excl. instr.) 28.37 34.58
first stage regression for TRUST
lnPOP -.019 -.003
(.012) (.010)




F (excl. instr.) 8.92 11.46
J .744 1.473
J (p-value) .389 .225
Notes: This table presents OLS and TSLS estimates of the eect of entry regulations on negative
externalities across countries. The top and bottom panel report rst and second stage results,
respectively. The dependent variable are emissions of organic water pollutant (kilograms per day
per worker) for 1998, from Djankov et al. (2002). The explanatory variable ENTRY is the (log of)
number of procedures required to start a new business; lnGDP and lnPOP are the (log of) country
GDP per capita and population in 1999; UK LEGAL is a dummy equal to one for British legal origin;
all four variables are also from Djankov et al. (2002). TRUST is the country average of the measure
of trust in the WVS. HIER is the fraction of people professing a hierarchical religion (Catholic
and Muslim) in 2000, from McCleary and Barro (2006). Robust standard errors are presented (in
parenthesis). The rst stage F statistic for the excluded instruments and the Hansen J statistic are
reported at the bottom of each column. ,  and  denote coecients signicantly dierent from
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